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WorldSummary. — More than two decades ago, Schlager and Ostrom (1992) developed ‘a conceptual schema for arraying property-rights
regimes that distinguishes among diverse bundles of rights’. The conceptual framework has profoundly inﬂuenced research on natural
resource governance, common property, and community resource management. However, currently natural resource governance has
changed dramatically, challenging the applicability of the conceptual schema. There are now many more social actors involved in re-
source management than the local communities at the focus of original analysis. Additionally, resource management increasingly pro-
vides access to various kinds of beneﬁts from outside the immediate context, including indirect beneﬁts such as payments for
environmental services and results-based payments for REDD+. These changes demand addition of new property rights to the original
framework. Those changes of governance process demand addition of property right to original framework. This paper updates the con-
ceptual schema in reaction to changes in natural resource governance, proposing three speciﬁc modiﬁcations on the focus of use rights,
control rights and authoritative rights to come up with a framework that distinguishes eight types of property rights. We apply the
framework to three purposefully selected governance interventions in China and Laos that include the provision of indirect beneﬁts
in addition to the direct beneﬁts derived by local people from natural resources. The empirical application shows how contemporary
governance changes may not lead to local people’s outright dispossession, since they continue to possess direct use rights to natural re-
sources. However, local people may be excluded from control and authoritative rights, which are exercised exclusively by state agencies
and international actors. The latter make available indirect beneﬁts to local people, which may or may not translate into use rights in the
sense of policy-based entitlements. The empirical insights suggest the possibility of a wider trend of ‘compensated exclusions’ in natural
resource governance.
 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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More than two decades ago, Schlager and Ostrom (1992)
developed ‘‘a conceptual schema for arraying property-rights
regimes that distinguishes among diverse bundles of rights”
(249). The conceptual framework has profoundly inﬂuenced
research on natural resource governance, common property,
and community resource management. Many researchers have
used the conceptual schema and the idea of property as bun-
dles of rights to move beyond simplistic categories of state,
private, and common property, and to distinguish diﬀerent
kinds of common property regimes (Benda-Beckmann,
Benda-Beckmann, & Wiber, 2006). A prominent illustration
is the comparison of four governance arrangements in India
and Nepal in Agrawal and Ostrom (2001).
The conceptual schema has also informed practice in natural
resource governance because its application yields direct impli-
cations for sustainable resource governance: Schlager and
Ostrom (1992) suggest that ‘‘[d]iﬀerent bundles of property
rights [. . .] aﬀect the incentives individuals face, the types of
actions they take, and the outcomes they achieve” (256). Nat-
ural resource management tends to be more sustainable if
local people participate actively in resource governance, as
demonstrated for forests (Andersson & Gibson, 2006;
Baland et al., 2010; Chhatre & Agrawal, 2009). Consequently,
international donors, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), and some governments have developed new forms
of collaborative resource management that facilitate local1
cite this article in press as: Sikor, T. et al. Property Rights Re
Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.12communities’ participation in decisions about management
objectives and practices, going beyond the recognition of mere
use rights (e.g., Edmunds & Wollenberg, 2003). Social and
environmental activists have drawn upon the schema to lobby
for the devolution of extensive bundles of natural resource
rights to local people (Rights & Resources Initiative, 2012).
Yet, natural resource governance has changed dramatically
over the past two decades, challenging the applicability of the
conceptual schema. There are now many more social actors
involved in resource management than the local communities
at the focus of Schlager and Ostrom’s (1992) analysis. More
often than not, local, national and/or international organiza-
tions of a private, non-governmental, or public nature engage
in practices or make rules relevant to resource management ingimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis Revisited,
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2 WORLD DEVELOPMENTa particular site (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999). Additionally, nei-
ther local communities nor the state can be assumed to be
homogenous or act as a single actor. Local communities are
often divided internally, with the consequence that diﬀerent
bundles of rights apply to diﬀerent community members
(Agrawal & Gibson, 1999). Similarly, states include a variety
of actors with diﬀerent mandates, resources, and interests
(Ribot, 2004).
Additionally, resource management increasingly creates
access to various kinds of beneﬁts provided from outside the
immediate context. Indirect beneﬁts such as payments for
environmental services (PES) or shared tourism revenues com-
plement directly derived beneﬁts, such as timber or the spiri-
tual value enjoyed by local people. The provision of
payments and other kinds of external support is entering pol-
icy in many countries as natural resource degradation dimin-
ishes the available direct beneﬁts, and increasingly aﬄuent
societies attribute rising importance to non-productive uses
of natural resources (e.g., Bennett, 2008; McElwee, 2011).
Indirect beneﬁts are also gaining importance for local resource
managers due to governments’ reluctance to devolve natural
resource management where it involves signiﬁcant material
and immaterial values (Ribot, Treue, & Lund, 2010).
Payments to local resource managers or other forms of
external subsidy assistance may become a primary component
of the global Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Forest Degradation (REDD+) mechanism. The introduction
of such policies and programs is diﬀerent from the past
emphasis on project-based support since they provide indirect
beneﬁts on a more permanent and institutionalized basis. Pro-
viding payments and compensations to local actors as a new
mode of governance aimed at improving or maintaining
ecosystem services transforms local decision-making and
property right arrangements beyond the notion of ‘‘bundles
of rights” (Phelps, Webb, & Agrawal, 2010).
Thus, there is a need to update the conceptual schema intro-
duced by Schlager and Ostrom (1992), particularly by incorpo-
rating insights from the analysis of decentralization (Agrawal
& Ribot, 1999) 1. The update requires a shift in the premises
underlying the framework by recognizing the multiplicity of
social actors and signiﬁcance of indirect beneﬁts, i.e., attention
to a more comprehensive set of relationships among social
actors with regard to direct and indirect beneﬁts. Yet, it would
beneﬁt from retaining the simplicity of the original framework
because simplicity allows comparisons and aﬀords inﬂuence
on practice. The update gains from maintaining property
rights as the central concept, property rights being understood
as all kinds of relationships among actors with respect to
objects (Bromley, 1992; von Benda-Beckmann & von Benda-
Beckmann, 1999). The focus on property rights, as they apply
in practice, provides an important ‘‘bottom-up” perspective on
natural resource governance that is complementary to analy-
ses centered on the relationships between diﬀerent governmen-
tal actors (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999).
We develop an updated version of Schlager and Ostrom’s
(1992) conceptual schema in this paper. 2 We propose three
speciﬁc modiﬁcations to come up with a framework that dis-
tinguishes eight types of property rights. We apply the frame-
work to three purposefully selected governance interventions
in China and Laos that include the provision of indirect ben-
eﬁts in addition to the direct beneﬁts derived by local people
from natural resources. The empirical application shows
how contemporary governance changes may not lead to local
people’s outright dispossession, since they continue to possess
direct use rights to natural resources. However, empirical
application also shows that local people are generally deniedPlease cite this article in press as: Sikor, T. et al. Property Rights Re
World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.12higher order property rights, with control and authoritative
rights to natural resource exercised exclusively by state agen-
cies and international actors. The latter make available indi-
rect beneﬁts to local people, which may or may not translate
into use rights in the sense of policy-based entitlements. Thus,
international organizations and norms increasingly inﬂuence
natural resource management on the ground while local com-
munities’ exclusion is compensated through indirect beneﬁts.
The paper begins with the conceptual discussion on how
Schlager and Ostrom’s (1992) framework can be updated use-
fully. It then proceeds to apply the framework to the three
cases before it compares and synthesizes key insights from
the three cases. The paper concludes with a discussion of the
theoretical and practical insights to be gained from applying
the updated framework.2. UPDATING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Schlager and Ostrom’s (1992) conceptual schema distin-
guishes ﬁve types of property rights: the rights of (physical)
access, withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation. 3
Underlying the distinction is the idea that rights are nested,
i.e., that the ﬁrst-order rights of access and withdrawal depend
on the exercise of the second-order rights of management,
exclusion, and alienation (Ostrom, 1994). The diﬀerence
between ﬁrst-order and second-order rights relates to ‘‘the dif-
ference between exercising a right and participating in the def-
inition of future rights to be exercised” (Schlager & Ostrom,
1992: 251). In particular, management refers to the ‘‘right to
regulate internal use patterns and transform the resource”,
thereby shaping the possibilities for withdrawal rights
(Schlager & Ostrom, 1992: 251).
This framework has rightly been critiqued for its static nat-
ure, whereas property rights are often dynamic (e.g.,
Rocheleau & Ross, 1995). Property rights may be ambiguous
in a particular setting, as diﬀerent social actors claim rights to
a resource through material and discursive means (Fortmann,
1995; Peluso, 1996). Moreover, many situations are character-
ized by the presence of multiple and overlapping legal systems,
something commonly referred to as legal pluralism (Benda-
Beckmann et al., 2006). As people relate their claims on natu-
ral resources to multiple legal systems, property rights come to
overlap, and claims sanctioned by diﬀerent legal systems get to
compete with each other (Sikor & Lund, 2009). Consequently,
negotiations over access to and control over natural resources
tend to make property rights a lot more dynamic than cap-
tured in Schlager and Ostrom’s (1992) schema.
Nevertheless, the conceptual schema oﬀers opportunities to
take concise snapshots of natural resource governance at par-
ticular times and places and to compare diﬀerent governance
arrangements to each other. These advantages continue to
hold even if one leaves the narrow conﬁnes of the original
schema to develop a more comprehensive framework. The
schema is able to accommodate a wider set of social actors
that relate to the direct beneﬁts derived from natural resources
and indirect beneﬁts associated with them. It can be adjusted
to consider intra-community variation (Agrawal & Gibson,
1999), social factors diﬀerentiating villagers such as gender
(Agarwal, 2001), and situations in which more than one ‘‘vil-
lage community” holds rights to a resource (Tubtim & Hirsch,
2005). Similarly, it is open to consider the involvement of
other kinds of social actors in resource governance, such as
NGOs, private companies, and international organizations.
Last but not least, the framework can accommodate a variety
of state actors at the local and national level, thereby integrat-gimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis Revisited,
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Ribot, 1999; Ribot, 2004).
We develop the property rights framework in three direc-
tions (see Figure 1). First, in connection to Schlager and
Ostrom’s (1992) operational-level right, we distinguish
between the rights to obtain direct and indirect beneﬁts and
name all ﬁrst-order of right as ‘‘use rights” for reasons of con-
venience. In our opinion, ‘‘use” communicates the nature of
these rights more intuitively than ‘‘withdrawal” in our opin-
ion. Also, note that we drop access rights from the list. Rights
of physical access may not be too important as a separable
right in many situations (cf. Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001: 489).
Moreover, the term ‘‘access” is commonly used to refer social
actors’ ability to beneﬁt from resources (Ribot & Peluso,
2003). As for use right, it is consisted of ‘‘direct use rights”
and ‘‘indirect use rights”. Direct use rights refer to the right
to obtain direct beneﬁts derived from a resource (e.g., catch
ﬁsh, harvest water, cut timber, etc.). Indirect use rights are
about the right to obtain indirect beneﬁts associated with a
resource, such as cash payments, the use of public goods, in-
kind support, etc. The latter relate to what Bromley and
Hodge (1990) term ‘‘presumptive policy entitlements”. In con-
trast to project-based support, policy-based provisions allow
social actors to develop the reasonable expectation that they
are the legitimate recipients of such indirect beneﬁts over a
period of time. Policy-based provisions thereby turn into
enduring entitlements, according certain actors use rights to
indirect beneﬁts. Illustrative examples are the agricultural
and rural development payments made in the European Union
(Bromley & Hodge, 1990; Sikor, 2005). 4 ‘‘Use” communicates
the nature of these rights more intuitively than ‘‘withdrawal”
in our opinion. Also, note that we drop access rights from
the list. Rights of physical access may not be too important
as a separable right in many situations (cf. Agrawal &
Ostrom, 2001: 489). Moreover, the term ‘‘access” is commonly
used to refer social actors’ ability to beneﬁt from resources
(Ribot & Peluso, 2003).
Second, we expand the second-order rights by integrating
rights of transaction and monitoring. We also refer to all
second-order rights as ‘‘control rights”, departing thus from
Schlager and Ostrom’s (1992) notion of collective-choice
rights. These rights are about ‘‘control” in the sense that theyFigure 1. Comparison between Schlager a
Please cite this article in press as: Sikor, T. et al. Property Rights Re
World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.12determine the scope of direct and indirect use rights 5; they can
also go beyond local communities’ collective-choice processes
with other non-local actors being involved in the exercise of
control rights (e.g., resource use monitoring by conservation
NGOs). As in the original schema, management refers to the
right to regulate internal use and transform the resource
(e.g., to restrict ﬁshing to particular species or times) Exclu-
sion is about the right to determine who has use rights to
direct and indirect beneﬁts (who can extract water, receive
payments, cut a tree, etc.). Monitoring refers to the right to
monitor the use of direct beneﬁts (e.g., observe ﬁshing opera-
tions) and indirect beneﬁts (e.g., audit payments) as well as the
state of the resource (e.g., assess carbon stocks). It is a separa-
ble and signiﬁcant right as illustrated by the attention to trans-
parency in resource governance (Lyster, 2011) and current
debates about participatory carbon/forest monitoring with
regard to REDD+(Balderas & Skutsch, 2012; Danielsen
et al., 2013).
Transaction rights relate to the activities required for the
realization of beneﬁts. In the case of direct beneﬁts, they are
about who has what right with regard to the activities required
to obtain the products of a resource (e.g., cut timber) and per-
use of them (e.g., sell timber). Distinguishing these transaction
rights from direct use rights is important because the rights to
conduct harvest operations and freely market natural resource
products is often withheld from villagers even where they have
use rights (Ribot et al., 2010) For example, villagers in China
and Mexico have been found to possess rights to the revenues
gained from logging but are denied the right to conduct the
logging operations themselves (Bray, Antinori, & Torres-
Rojo, 2006; He, 2016). As for indirect beneﬁts, these rights
are about handling the involved contractual matters, such as
the collection and disbursement of payments. Again, this is
an important distinction from indirect use rights because vil-
lagers may hold rights to receive payments but not be granted
the right to make decisions about the disbursement and distri-
bution of the payments. In Vietnam, for example, the provin-
cial government holds the right to receive and disburse
payments from forest service; in turn, this right may be exer-
cised to retain the payments received from service buyers,
instead of disbursing them to forest holders (McElwee,
2011:420).nd Ostrom’s and updating framework.
gimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis Revisited,
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4 WORLD DEVELOPMENTThird, we add a third-order rights to Schlager and Ostrom
(1992), which we call ‘‘authoritative rights” since they
empower their holders to authorize control rights. Just as con-
trol rights deﬁne the scope of use rights, authoritative rights
determine the control rights applicable to particular resources,
for example by deﬁning minimum environmental standards
(Ribot et al., 2010). They exert direct inﬂuence on the exercise
of control rights, as Ostrom recognized in work subsequent to
the publication of the 1992 article. 6 They can be held at local,
national state or global levels, i.e., they are not necessarily held
by central state agencies although those exert dominant inﬂu-
ence on resource management in many countries (Agrawal &
Ostrom, 2001: 489).
We suggest the utility of distinguishing two types of author-
itative rights, which we term the rights of deﬁnition and allo-
cation. Deﬁnition rights are about the discretionary space 7
available for the exercise of control rights. For example, cen-
tral governments typically conﬁne management rights by clas-
sifying forest for either production or protection purposes,
which in turn shapes the rights available to land managers.
Or, customary rules may declare a particular water source to
be a spiritual site, perhaps in line with global rules on cultural
heritage, which may in turn condition a village community’s
right to exclude villagers and others from extracting water.
Central governments often deﬁne the scope of control rights
by designating land as forest, propagating scientiﬁc forestry
and deﬁning proper land management practices (Forsyth &
Walker, 2008; Peluso & Vandergeest, 2001). They also conﬁne
their scope when they regulate harvest quotas and allowable
logging practices (He, 2016; Smith et al., 2006). Yet, central
state actors are not the only ones possessing deﬁnition rights
since other kinds of actors, such as customary leaders, inﬂu-
ence the scope of control rights in many contexts. Deﬁnition
rights are increasingly held by international bodies, i.e.,
inter-state agreements such as the UNFCCC (Loevbrandt,
2009; Lyster, 2011) and non-governmental bodies such as
the Forest Stewardship Council (Cashore, Auld, & Newsom,
2004) and Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance
(Suiseeya & Caplow, 2013).Textbox. Eight types of property rights
Use rights are the rights to enjoy beneﬁts, including
1. use of direct benefits: the right to obtain beneﬁts
directly derived from a resource
2. use of indirect benefits: the right to obtain indirect
beneﬁts associated with a resource
Control rights refer to various kinds of ‘‘second-order”
rights to determine the scope of use rights. They include
the rights of
3. management: the right to regulate use and transform
the resource
4. exclusion: the right to deﬁne who has use rights
5. transaction: the right to handle the activities
required for the realization of beneﬁts
6. monitoring: the right to monitor the use of beneﬁts
and state of the resource
Authoritative rights are ‘‘third-order” rights to deﬁne
control rights. They include the rights of
7. Definition: the right to deﬁne the discretionary space
for the exercise of control rights
8. Allocation: the right to assign control rights to par-
ticular actors
Please cite this article in press as: Sikor, T. et al. Property Rights Re
World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.12Allocation refers to the right to assign control rights to par-
ticular actors. It relates to alienation in Schlager and Ostrom’s
(1992) original schema, which is deﬁned as ‘‘the right to sell or
lease” control rights. However, in the original deﬁnition, it is
commonly, control rights are assigned to particular actors
through legal acts under national law, international rules, cus-
tomary arrangements, etc. then, the user would sell or lease
out the control right. Allocation, on the other hand, is broader
when we take the consideration of indirect beneﬁt and multi-
plicity of social actors. In most situations, there are various
actors which demand control rights over forests, or would
qualify for the exercise of such rights (Edmunds &
Wollenberg, 2003; Ribot, 2004). This multiplicity requires
decisions about which actors get to exercise control rights.
The actor making such decisions can be considered to have
an allocation right. For example, the central governments of
Indonesia exercised allocation rights when they shifted control
rights on forests away from centralized forest departments to
district governments at the end of the 1990s (Wollenberg et al.,
2006).
Thus, updating the original schema developed by Schlager
and Ostrom (1992) we end up with a framework that distin-
guishes eight types of property rights (see Textbox). The
updated framework, we suggest, facilitates analysis of contem-
porary changes in natural resource governance. Especially, by
examining who is holding a more diverse array of property
rights, this framework helps examining how communities
may be compensated for being excluded from the exercise of
higher level rights. We now set out to demonstrate its analyt-
ical power by applying the framework to three forest gover-
nance arrangements in East Asia.3. METHODS AND STUDY SITES
The research has followed a comparative case study
approach, involving a total of ten governance interventions
in China, Indonesia, Laos, and Vietnam. In this paper, we pre-
sent results from three cases in China and Laos to exemplify
governance interventions under which indirect beneﬁts are dis-
bursed to villagers, whereas others seven cases the indirect
beneﬁt largely remain hold by either government or interna-
tional organization. This selection also allows us examine
the changes of governance in natural resource when the emerg-
ing indirect beneﬁt received by local communities. The selected
governance interventions are the Sloping Land Conversion
Program (SLCP) and a Voluntary Carbon Market Project
(VCMP) in China and a tourism revenue-sharing initiative in
the Nam Neun—Nam Et Phou Loei (NN-NEPL) park in
Laos. Two of the interventions, the VCMP in China and
NN-NEPL in Laos, involve international NGOs, allowing us
to examine governance arrangements that include a wider set
of actors at local, national, and international levels.
For the study of each governance intervention, we have
selected a ﬁeld site to analyze their actual operations on the
ground (see Table 1). These sites are not representative in a
statistical sense, but are expected to allow us moving beyond
the study of policy regulations and program guidelines to
understand property rights in practice. Because actual prop-
erty rights often diﬀer from legal codes and policy texts, we
deemed it necessary to apply our conceptual framework in
particular sites to examine the governance interventions ‘‘from
the ground up”. As such, we also intend to demonstrate this
framework could be applicable to non-forest natural resource,
although the primary focus on those three cases study is
forest.gimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis Revisited,
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Table 1. The study sites
Governance intervention Village Location Forest type Land use issue
Sloping Land Conversion
Program (SLCP)
Pingzhang Baoshan, China Sub-tropical forest
dominated by pine
plantations
Upland farming vs.
Tree plantations
Voluntary Carbon Market
Project (VCMP)
Zhoujiabo Tengchong, China Sub-tropical forest
dominated by mixed
stands and ﬁr
plantations
Upland farming vs.
Tree plantations
Tourism revenue -sharing in
Nam Neun—Nam Et Phou
Loei (NN-NEPL)
Sonekhoua
Homephanh
Viengthong, Laos Tropical rainforest
dominated by
natural mixed stands
Human use vs.
Conservation
PROPERTY RIGHTS REGIMES AND NATURAL RESOURCES: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS REVISITED 5Data collection in 2011–12 included various methods. In
each site, we began with a round of exploratory research that
combined key informant interviews, group discussions, and
transect walks to identify the relevant actors and their claims
on the forest. In a second round of in-depth research, we con-
ducted a total of 53 interviews with key informants (village
leaders, state oﬃcials, NGO staﬀ, etc.: n = 33 in China and
n = 20 in Laos), 64 semi-structured interviews (n = 48 in
China and n = 16 in Laos) with randomly selected villagers
and numerous informal conversations with villagers and gov-
ernment staﬀ to describe actual forest uses and distil the prop-
erty rights held by various actors. 8 We also reviewed policy
and project documents related to forest-related interventions,
such as legal texts, national, and provincial policy guidelines,
local government and project reports, contracts, management
plans, protection and management regulations, etc.
Data analyses involved two steps. We ﬁrst performed a
descriptive analysis of each intervention by relating our data
to the eight types of property rights in the conceptual frame-
work. This yielded an understanding of property rights
regimes in each site. We then compared the property rights
regimes to each other to reveal similarities and diﬀerences
between them. We follow these two steps when discussing
our results in the following.4. PROPERTY RIGHTS REGIMES IN CHINA AND
LAOS
(a) The Sloping Land Conversion program (SLCP) in
Pingzhang, China
Background: China’s central government initiated the SLCP
in 1999 in response to the cessation of ﬂow in the Yellow River
and major ﬂoods in the Yangtze and other basins (Bennett,
2008; Xu et al., 2004). The SLCP has sought to convert crop-
ping land on steep slopes into forestland by oﬀering payments
to farmers in return for tree plantations. The payments
stretched over a period of ﬁve or eight years depending on
the type of tree planted, and were extended by another ﬁve/
eight years in 2006 at half the original rate. The SLCP resem-
bles the diverse PES schemes that have sprung up all world-
wide (He, 2014; Li et al., 2011). It may be the world’s
largest since it has provided payments to some 124 million
farmers.
In Pingzhang, an administrative village with a population of
1680, farmers established 87 ha of tree plantations on their
previous farmland under the SLCP, which account for 10%
of their total agricultural land. They planted pear trees in
2002, for which they received subsidies for a total of ten years,
and walnut trees in 2005, which are accompanied by paymentsPlease cite this article in press as: Sikor, T. et al. Property Rights Re
World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.12for 16 years. Most farmers welcomed the SLCP since it pro-
vided support in their livelihood transition from land-based
production to a combination of on-farm activities with migra-
tion (He & Sikor, 2015).
Use rights: Farmers hold use rights to all direct benefits
derived from the tree plantations in correspondence with their
land certiﬁcates 9. Their rights include the fruit harvested from
pear and walnut trees, the latter promising to become the most
signiﬁcant source of cash income in the village. The use rights
extend to the agricultural crops and medicinal plants inter-
cropped by farmers in initial years (He et al., 2009). The con-
version from agricultural to forestland implies that farmers’
land certiﬁcates have duration of 70 years instead of 30 years.
However, the uses of the land allowed under the SLCP are
highly restricted, as discussed below.
Similarly, farmers possess use rights to virtually all of the
indirect benefits associated with the plantations. They receive
an annual subsidy of $576/ha for ﬁve (pear) or eight (walnut)
years, followed by such payments at half this rate for another
ﬁve or eight years. The county forest department’s entitlement
under SLCP looks small in comparison, as it is limited to
$115/ha in the ﬁrst year to fund the provision of free seedlings
to participating farmers. As this payment, the farmers signed a
contract with government to ensure they do not convert their
aﬀorested land back to agriculture purpose and maintain the
forest to reach a certain survival rate during the project period.
Control rights: Five state units share the control rights over
the tree plantations: the county forest department, the provin-
cial ﬁnance department, the township government, the min-
istry of ﬁnance and the State Forestry Administration. 10
Farmers’ exercise of control rights is restricted to the sale of
fruit harvested from the tree plantations.
The county forest department and township government
possess management and exclusion rights since they together
make the mandated decisions in the implementation of the
SLCP. They select the tree species to be planted, specify the sil-
vicultural methods farmers have to employ, and impose
restrictions on farmers’ land management practices. They also
zone the area in which farmers are eligible for payments with-
out consulting villagers, which has caused signiﬁcant dismay
on farmers’ side (He & Lang, 2015). They exercise signiﬁcant
leverage on the location of eligible areas since the national cri-
terion of exceeding 25 degrees of slope leaves plenty of room
for interpretation.
Transaction and monitoring rights involve a wider set of state
units. Timber transactions are generally subject to approval
from the county forest department and township government
under a harvest restriction called ‘‘Quota System” (He, 2016).
With this quota system, the county and township oﬃcials can
exercise the power to decide what and how much can be har-
vest, although the tree and forestland is holding by farmers.gimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis Revisited,
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6 WORLD DEVELOPMENTFinancial transactions are handled directly by the provincial
ﬁnance department, which disburses the subsidies against a
certiﬁcate of tree survival rates in farmers’ plantations. This
certiﬁcate is issued by the county forest department, which is
in charge of monitoring plantations. The ﬁnancial transactions
between the provincial ﬁnance department and farmers are
monitored by the ministry of ﬁnance together with the State
Forestry Administration.
Authoritative rights: Central state units hold the authorita-
tive rights over the tree plantations farmers planted in
Pingzhang under the SLCP. China’s central forest agency,
the State Forestry Administration, possesses the rights to
define the control rights exercised by lower level state units,
with the sole exception of payment rates, which are set by
the State Council. The Administration deﬁnes the
discretionary space available to the lower level units narrowly.
For example, the State Forestry Administration speciﬁes the
minimum survival rate to be met for the disbursement of
payments, deﬁnes what kinds of areas and tree species could
be covered under the SLCP, mandates the application of cer-
tain silvicultural practices, regulates intercropping in newly
established plantations, and requires that the involved land
is legally converted from agricultural to forest land. It is also
the central state deﬁne the allocation rights are shared between
the State Forestry Administration and State Council, since the
former assigns the management and exclusion rights to the
township government and county forest department, and the
latter allocates transaction and monitoring rights to the
involved county forest and provincial ﬁnance departments as
well as the ministry of ﬁnance.
In sum, as a state-led program, the tree plantations estab-
lished under the SLCP in Pingzhang connect farmers to a vari-
ety of state units in a governance arrangement that is centered
around the state and highly centralized. Farmers enjoy use
rights to direct and indirect beneﬁts but do not participate in
the exercise of control and authoritative rights. The latter
are shared among various local and central state units,
whereby ﬁve local units share control rights and two central
state units possess authoritative rights. In sum, China’s State
Forestry Administration uses its deﬁnition rights to delimit
the discretionary space available to the control exercised by
local state units and to restrict the use rights held by farmers
in a narrow manner. As a result, local line state agencies con-
centrate the power for implementation, while farmers are
excluded from decision-making and compensated with indirect
beneﬁts (subsidies).
(b) A Voluntary Carbon Market Project (VCMP) in Zhouji-
abo, China
Background: The Forestry Department of Yunnan Province,
Conservation International (CI), and The Nature Conser-
vancy (TNC) teamed up in 2004 to implement the VCMP in
three counties of Yunnan province. Drawing on a donation
of the 3 M company, the three organizations selected Teng-
chong County as a pilot site for a total investment of around
USD1 million. They have provided payments and in-kind sup-
port to local farmers planting a mix of native trees on previous
agricultural land. The project was approved as a small-scale
aﬀorestation and reforestation project under the Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism (CDM) and was awarded Gold Rating
under the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance
(CCBA). 11 It covers a total of 468 ha of mixed forest in the
surroundings of the Gaoligongshan Nature Reserve, involving
1,367 villagers in four villages next to a state-owned and
another privately owned forest farm. A ﬁrst sale of carbonPlease cite this article in press as: Sikor, T. et al. Property Rights Re
World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.12emissions reductions occurred in 2008, when TNC/CI sold
veriﬁed emissions reductions of nearly 21,000 tons on the vol-
untary carbon market for a price of $10 per ton.
We examine the VCMP’s operations in Zhoujiabo, where
the project assisted 50 households in planting native trees on
an area of 15 ha in 2005. Zhoujiabo is an administrative vil-
lage of 635 households, who live mostly from upland farming.
The project targeted an area where farmers had grown corn
and wheat for their own subsistence. Its staﬀ successfully con-
vinced farmers to plant trees due to the low productivity of
agriculture. Nevertheless, farmers today feel that they have
experienced a signiﬁcant loss because the payments do not
match up to the beneﬁts foregone from converting agricultural
land to tree plantations.
Use rights: Farmers possess use rights to all direct benefits
derived from the involved land, as they holding the certiﬁcate
of land as forestland. They are allowed to collect ﬁrewood and
non-timber forest products (NTFPs) in the tree plantations
and are generally expected to receive the revenues made from
the sale of timber after the projects terminates in 2035. Simi-
larly to the SLCP, most land certiﬁcates have changed from
agriculture to forestry, extending their duration from 30 to
70 years, but also restricting the allowable uses.
Farmers share the use rights to indirect benefits with
TNC/CI and the county forest department. In 2008, when
TNC/CI sold veriﬁed emissions reductions for a period of ﬁve
years they retained 25% of the carbon revenues as a transac-
tion fee. Farmers received 60% of the carbon revenues, which
translated into $266 per ha of planted trees (for ﬁve years).
The remaining 15% went to the county forest department. In
the future, the plan is to reduce farmers’ share to 53%.
Control rights: The county forest department, township gov-
ernment, and TNC/CI share most the control rights over the
tree plantations. Although TNC/CI do not have a permanent
presence in Tengchong County, they participated in the
exercise of control rights via technical consultants and the
TNC/CI oﬃce in Kunming.
The county forest department and TNC/CI together possess
management and exclusion rights. In 2005, they selected tree
species after some consultation with villagers and zoned the
areas suitable for tree plantations. They also deﬁned the
required management practices to be performed by farmers,
such as the conduct of thinning operations every ﬁve years.
Since then, farmers’ role in management has been restricted
to the provision of required silvicultural operations and labor
for pest control, ﬁre protection, etc. The county forest depart-
ment selects the farmers planting trees, and recruits the ones
performing silvicultural management.
Transaction rights are divided between local state units and
TNC/CI. The county forest department and township govern-
ment allocate harvest quotas for timber, as discussed for the
SLCP above. The county forest department also handles the
disbursement of payments to farmers and laborers. In con-
trast, TNC/CI possess transactions rights related to carbon.
They sell veriﬁed carbon emissions reductions on the interna-
tional markets and decide about the allocation of available
funds from the initial donation and transaction fee for man-
agement operations without consultation of the county forest
department.
The county forest department, provincial forest department
and TNC/CI share the monitoring rights over the tree planta-
tions established in Zhoujiabo. The county forest department
assesses tree survival and growth, checks compliance with the
required silvicultural practices, and hires farmers as guards to
protect the plantations against theft, ﬁre and other forms of
destruction. The provincial forest department audits thegimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis Revisited,
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forest department. TNC/CI sends in designated consultants
every few years to verify carbon stocks.
Authoritative rights: China’s State Forestry Administration
shares authoritative rights with international bodies. Definition
rights are exercised by the State Forestry Administration, for
example by way of the restrictions imposed on the manage-
ment of land designated for forestry, and the regulations appli-
cable to the allocation of timber harvest quotas. Additionally,
deﬁnition rights are also held by the CDM and CCBA. The
CDM conﬁnes the discretionary space available to the exercise
of management, transaction and monitoring rights by issuing
methodologies for the calculation of carbon stocks, veriﬁed
emissions reduction, and the veriﬁcation of carbon stocks. 12
The CCBA inﬂuences the exercise of control rights through
its standards for the protection of local communities and bio-
diversity, such as the requirement to inform and consult local
people. In contrast, allocation rights are largely held by the
State Forestry Administration. TNC/CI would not have been
able to participate in the exercise of control rights without the
Administration’s authorization.
Thus, despite some diﬀerences, VCMP and SLCP share
state-centered and centralized governance arrangements: the
state exercises control and authoritative rights without partic-
ipation by local farmers: central state agencies hold authorita-
tive rights and deﬁne control rights in a restrictive manner,
whereas lower level state units are conﬁned to control rights.
Yet, the governance of the VCMP signiﬁcantly departs from
the SLCP due to the involvement of international actors in
the exercise of control and authoritative rights. TNC/CI holds
control rights together with local state units, and the CDM
and CCBA possess authoritative rights next to China’s State
Forestry Administration. Although the governance
arrangement remains very much centralized, the involvement
of international NGOs introduces some counterbalance, with
shared decision-making power at the control right level. Local
farmers however are generally excluded from the processes of
project planning and implementation and remain simple ben-
eﬁciaries of indirect beneﬁts.
(c) Tourism revenue-sharing in NN-NEPL, Laos
Background: The Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) and
NN-NEPL park administration started the tourism revenue-
sharing project in 2009 with funding from the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service. The project seeks to attract tourists
to visiting the park, and to share the revenues generated from
ecotourism with people living next to the park. The objective is
that local people ﬁnd jobs with the private tour operators, and
that a share of the revenues is channeled into village develop-
ment funds. The share depends on the number of wildlife
sightings reported by tourists, which in turn is expected to pro-
vide an incentive for villagers to stop hunting protected wild-
life. From 2012, the project included 14 villages in the revenue-
sharing.
Sonekhoua is a village of 180 households located next to
the main ecotourism site. Due to its vicinity, members of 33
households ﬁnd occasional employment in tourism as tour
guides, boatmen, cooks, and camp managers. Homephanh
is another village of 81 households, but too far from the
tourist track to enjoy employment opportunities. Both vil-
lages operate development funds which receive a share of
the tourism revenues annually and ﬁnance small develop-
ment activities such as the purchase of communal equip-
ment and supplies. Nevertheless, people in both villages
share the profound sentiment that the gazetting of the parkPlease cite this article in press as: Sikor, T. et al. Property Rights Re
World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.12in the 1990s caused a signiﬁcant loss of access to land and
other resources.
Use rights: Since the creation of the NN-NEPL park in
1993, villagers have been deprived of use rights to direct bene-
fits with the exception of NTFPs, unprotected wildlife, and
construction wood and ﬁrewood from unprotected tree spe-
cies. They are not allowed to extract NTFPs and timber for
commercial purposes, hunt protected wildlife, clear land for
cultivation, or graze livestock. Their use rights are formally
limited to land outside the park’s core zone but in practice
extend into the zone on a customary basis. As for indirect
benefits, villagers hold restricted use rights to the revenues gen-
erated from ecotourism. These are restricted in their size, since
tour operators keep most of the revenues and proﬁts made
from tourism, and depend on the tour companies complying
with their obligations toward villagers. Moreover, only people
from Sonekhoua enjoy these use rights, which for example,
translate into a $7.50 daily wage and allowance for villagers
serving as guides. The park administration and WCS also hold
use rights to a share of the tourism revenues in form of the
park entrance fee (USD3/visitor) and allowance for the
WCS guide (USD9/day).
Control rights: The park administration and WCS possess
control rights jointly. WCS’s inﬂuential role ﬁnds visible evi-
dence in the location of their oﬃces in the park headquarters
and the permanent presence of WCS staﬀ, including an inter-
national advisor. Villagers’ involvement in the exercise of con-
trol right is negligible in comparison. The district government
possesses formal rights to be involved in matters requiring
active involvement of the local population, such as the eco-
tourism initiative, but has little inﬂuence in practice.
WCS and the park administration possess management and
exclusion rights. They together designed the park management
plan, identiﬁed the wildlife species to aﬀect villagers’ share in
the generated revenues, and selected the villages included in
the ecotourism initiative (the latter after formal consultation
with the district government). In contrast, village committees’
role is restricted to disseminating information on wildlife con-
servation regulations and project rules to villagers. They have
a role in pre-selecting candidates for employment in tourism,
but do so according to criteria drafted by the park administra-
tion and WCS (Wildlife Conservation Society, 2010).
WCS possesses the transaction rights on indirect beneﬁts and
jointly executes monitoring rights with the park administra-
tion. WCS collects the applicable share of revenues from the
tour operators, receives tourists’ reports about wildlife sight-
ings, accordingly calculates villagers’ shares in revenues, and
disburses payments to individual villagers for services ren-
dered and to the village development funds. The organization
also purchases communal equipment and supplies once vil-
lagers have identiﬁed their priorities for the use of the funds
accrued in a year. In contrast, villagers can handle all transac-
tions related to direct beneﬁts (NTFPs and unprotected wild-
life). As for monitoring rights, the park administration holds
the formal mandate to monitor the protected wildlife and
enforce restrictions on the park’s use. In practice, it receives
signiﬁcant technical and ﬁnancial support from the WCS in
monitoring, which means that the two exercise the right of
monitoring together. The village committees are in charge of
monitoring the use of indirect beneﬁts, mainly the equipment
and supplies purchased from the development funds.
Authoritative rights: The Ministry of Natural Resources and
Environment holds exclusive authority over the NN-NEPL
park according to Lao legislation, yet in practice WCS partic-
ipates in the exercise of authoritative rights. WCS exercises
definition rights by deﬁning the overarching objectives of parkgimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis Revisited,
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required monitoring together with the Ministry. The organiza-
tion has played a key role in raising the potential of and fram-
ing the debate about ecotourism with involved actors at the
national and local level, bringing to bear its own international
experience and codes of good practice. Allocation rights are
held by the Lao central government, particularly through its
mandate to designate jurisdiction over parts of the national
territory to a park administration, and to regulate the opera-
tion of international organizations in the country. By gazetting
the NN-NEPL area as a national protected area, the central
government allocated all control rights to the park administra-
tion.
In sum, the tourism revenue-sharing initiative in NN-NEPL
resembles the VCMP in China as it combines a state-centered
governance arrangement with the involvement of an interna-
tional NGO. The park administration holds control rights
accorded by the central government and the Ministry of Nat-
ural Resources and Environment. WCS exerts signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on the exercise of control and authoritative rights,
and holds a small share in indirect use rights. Yet in contrast
to the VCMP, the involvement of the international NGO leads
governance in NN-NEPL to be less centralized than in the
VCMP because WCS brings to bear their strong presence on
the ground on the exercise of authoritative rights. The increas-
ing role of international NGO enable the further power shar-
ing and balancing in NN-NEPL, while the farmers are
remaining excluded from higher level of decision-making in
the program, as lacking the mechanism for local participation
from the very beginning of planning and implementation pro-
cess when the project is setting up.5. THE GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS IN COM-
PARISON
Application of the property rights framework allows com-
paring the governance arrangements (see Table 2). The three
arrangements diﬀer in the social actors involved, and how
use rights, control rights, and authoritative rights are dis-
tributed among them.
Villagers possess use rights to direct beneﬁts in all three
arrangements. However, the material signiﬁcance of these
direct use rights varies signiﬁcantly among the three sites
(see Table 3). Direct use rights translate into the most sizable
material beneﬁts in the SLCP due to the selection of walnut as
a highly valuable commercial tree crop. 13 Villagers’ material
beneﬁts are signiﬁcant in NN-NEPL because villagers rely
on wild meat as an important source of protein and on trees
for construction materials. The material beneﬁts derived from
direct use rights are small in the VCMP since the land is
degraded.
Our results mirror a key ﬁnding of wider research on partic-
ipatory forest management: the use rights devolved to local
people are often restricted to secondary forest products and,
therefore, do not translate into tangible material beneﬁts
(Edmunds & Wollenberg, 2003; Springate-Baginski & Piers,
2007). In our cases, land use restrictions limit the beneﬁts that
villagers can derive from their use rights in the VCMP and
NN-NEPL, particularly the bans on cultivation and hunting
of protected wildlife. The situation is diﬀerent in Pingzhang
because walnut plantations are highly proﬁtable, and because
walnut is considered to be an ‘‘ecological tree” and subsidized
for 16 years under the SLCP.
A new element in the governance arrangements arises from
the indirect beneﬁts which complement the direct beneﬁtsPlease cite this article in press as: Sikor, T. et al. Property Rights Re
World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.12accruing to villagers in all three sites. Indirect beneﬁts are
overall as signiﬁcant as direct beneﬁts in terms of their mate-
rial value, although that varies between sites (see Table 3).
Despite the high commercial value of walnut, the payments
disbursed by the SLCP oﬀer critical support in the initial years
and contribute to the proﬁtability of walnut plantations. In
contrast, two thirds of the beneﬁts derived by villagers from
the VCMP are due to the payments, yet even with the pay-
ments, revenues are low. In NN-NEPL, the beneﬁts derived
by villagers from their indirect use rights are currently low,
but could become more signiﬁcant if the number of tourist
arrivals increased. 14
Moreover, villagers’ access to indirect beneﬁts may translate
into use rights over time. In all three sites, not only villagers
but also government oﬃcials, the staﬀ of international NGOs,
and other involved actors have come to see the provision of
indirect beneﬁts as ‘‘presumptive policy entitlements” in the
sense of Bromley and Hodge (1990). Villagers, in particular,
have built up robust claims that they are entitled to compen-
sation for the restrictions imposed on their land use, as we
have argued for Pingzhang elsewhere (He & Sikor, 2015). At
the same time, these indirect use rights depend on commit-
ments of actors unaccountable to communities. They are less
robust than rights certiﬁed in legal codes or administrative reg-
ulations. They may be stronger where villagers hold tenure
rights to the relevant land, i.e., in the SLCP and VCMP, as
reﬂected in villagers’ higher share in total indirect beneﬁts.
This would match the insights of other research about the
inﬂuence of land tenure on local people’s ability to beneﬁt
from environmental payments (Corbera & Brown, 2010;
Mahanty et al., 2013).
Villagers are not the only actors that may command over
use rights to indirect beneﬁts. As indirect use rights develop
in the three governance arrangements, some of the other
actors claim a share in them. This is most apparent in NN-
NEPL, as the tour operators keep the largest share of tourism
revenues to themselves, and villagers’ rights to a share of the
revenues depends on operators transferring them. Yet even
in the VCMP, villagers receive 60% of the carbon ﬁnance only,
the rest being divided between TNC/CI and the county forest
department. These insights demonstrate how other actors,
such as INGOs and private companies, are able to establish
rights to indirect beneﬁts in similar ways as villagers although
they do not possess any rights to the land itself. They develop
use rights to indirect beneﬁts by virtue of their superior com-
mand over ﬁnance, networks, and expertise (Corbera &
Brown, 2010; Mathur et al., 2014).
How does villagers’ share in indirect use rights compare with
the proportion of project-based funds reaching villagers? The
evidence from the VCMP and NN-NEPL suggests that the
beneﬁt-sharing may be more favorable to villagers in the case
of indirect use rights. Villagers did not receive any signiﬁcant
share in the initial investments made by TNC/CI and WCS.
The large majority of the funds raised for the VCMP and man-
agement of NN-NEPL go toward the NGOs’ operational
costs, consultant fees, and state budgets. Villagers’ shares in
indirect beneﬁts, therefore, are signiﬁcantly more sizable than
in the initial investments, although they are not the only ones
possessing indirect use rights.
While villagers hold use rights, they do not participate in the
exercise of control or authoritative rights, as has been noted in
much research over the past 15 years (Ribot, 2004; Ribot,
Agrawal, & Larson, 2006; Tacconi, 2007). Despite extensive
international eﬀorts of promoting decentralization most gov-
ernance arrangements ‘‘assign no more than the operational-
level rights [. . .] to those whom the program is supposed togimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis Revisited,
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Table 3. Monetary values of direct and indirect benefits
SLCP VCMP NN-NEPL
Direct beneﬁts
 Walnut harvested from planted trees
 crops planted between trees
 Timber after 30 years
 NTFPs
 NTFPs
 non-protected wildlife
 construction materials
NPV direct ($/ha) 6,257 448 1,154
Indirect beneﬁts
 Free seedlings
 cash payments for 16 years
 Free seedlings
 carbon credits
 Tourism revenue-sharing
 tourism jobs
NPV indirect ($/ha) 3,894 966 19
Note: Net present values (NPVs) are rough estimates over a 30-year period and calculated for comparative purposes only. USD 1 = 6.5 CNY in 2011.
Table 2. The governance arrangements in comparison
SLCP (China) VCMP (China) NN-NEPL (Laos)
Use rights
Direct beneﬁts Farmers (fruit and crops) Farmers (NTFPs, ﬁrewood, and
timber after 30 years)
Villagers (NTFPs, unprotected
wildlife, construction wood, and
ﬁrewood)
Indirect beneﬁts Mostly farmers, minor share held
by county forest department
Farmers (largest share) with
TNC/CI and county forest
department
Company, WCS, villagers, and
park administration share
tourism revenues
Control rights
Management County forest department and
township government select tree
species and determine
management practices
County forest department and
TNC/CI select tree species and
determine management practices
Park administration and WCS
develop management plan
Exclusion County forest department and
township government zone
eligible areas
County forest department and
TNC/CI zone suitable areas;
county forest department selects
farmers
Park administration and WCS
select villages and issue rules on
selection of villagers; village
committees select villagers
Transaction villagers sell fruit; county forest
department and township
government allocate harvest
quota for timber; provincial
ﬁnance department disburses
payments
county forest department and
township government allocate
timber harvest quota; TNC/CI
sell carbon credits; county forest
department disburses payments
to farmers
WCS disburses payments
received from tourism company
and purchases collective goods
paid from village funds
Monitoring County forest department
assesses tree survival rates;
ministry of ﬁnance and State
Forestry Administration inspect
provincial ﬁnance department
County forest department
assesses tree survival rates;
provincial forest department
inspects disbursement of
payments; TNC/CI veriﬁes
carbon stocks
Park administration and WCS
monitor forest use and payments
Authoritative rights
Deﬁnition State Forestry Administration
speciﬁes range of allowable tree
species and management
practices
State Forestry Administration,
some inﬂuence by CDM and
CCBA
Ministry of Natural Resources
and Environment issues
regulations, WCS draws on code
of practice and international
norms
Allocation State Forestry Administration
allocates management and
exclusion rights to county forest
department; State Council
allocates transaction and
monitoring rights to provincial
ﬁnance and county forest
departments
State Forestry Administration
allocates the rights of
management and exclusion to
county forest department and
TNC/CI
Central government assigns
control rights to park
administration and issues
operating permit to WCS
PROPERTY RIGHTS REGIMES AND NATURAL RESOURCES: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS REVISITED 9beneﬁt” (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001: 492). The power structure
in our three governance arrangements can be characterized as
state-centered because the exercise of control and authorita-
tive rights largely remains in the hands of state actors. If vil-Please cite this article in press as: Sikor, T. et al. Property Rights Re
World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.12lagers are involved then it is in a very restricted manner,
such as the village committee in NN-NEPL that selects
villagers for employment in tourism—according to rules set
by WCS and the park administration.gimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis Revisited,
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10 WORLD DEVELOPMENTYet, our comparative insights indicate the potential for sig-
niﬁcant changes in state-centered natural resource governance,
which may promote power sharing and balancing. The gover-
nance arrangements characterizing the VCMP and NN-NEPL
are diﬀerent from the highly centralized SLCP. In the SLCP,
control rights are located at the local state and authoritative
rights at the central state, and central state units impose nar-
row restrictions on the exercise of control rights. In contrast,
in the VCMP and NN-NEPL international NGOs participate
in the exercise of control rights on the ground. Thanks to their
ﬁnancial prowess, they are able to get involved in natural
resource management, supplementing or even taking the place
of local state units. They may do so in a very visible manner
through staﬀ placed with local state units, such as WCS in
NN-NEPL, or in more indirect ways, such as CI and TNC
in the VCMP.
Another signiﬁcant change in natural resource governance
may originate from the inﬂuence of international norms on
the exercise of authoritative rights. The exercise of formal
authoritative rights is no longer the sole prerogative of central
state units, such as China’s State Forestry Administration.
Instead, international conventions such as the Convention
on Biological Diversity and CDM, transnational rules made
by hybrid organizations such as the CCBA, and codes of good
practice issued by international conservation organizations
inﬂuence the exercise of authoritative rights. Their inﬂuence
speaks to the globalization of natural resource management,
whether it is in biodiversity conservation (Rodrı´guez et al.,
2007) or forestry (Lyster, 2011; Suiseeya & Caplow, 2013).
It remains to be seen how the involvement of international
NGOs and inﬂuence of international norms connects with cen-
tralizing and decentralizing forces in natural resource gover-
nance. It has been argued that international initiatives,
particularly REDD+, may reinforce (re-)centralizing tenden-
cies in governance (Milne, 2012; Phelps et al., 2010;
Sandbrook et al., 2010). Our insights from the VCMP indicate
how internationalization may bolster centralized governance
arrangements: the involvement of TNC/CI closely follows
the line of command within China’s state structures, and the
CCBA certiﬁcation did not lead to signiﬁcant involvement
by villagers. Yet, the involvement of international NGOs
and eﬀects of international norms may also help to counterbal-
ance centralizing forces and change power structure, as indi-
cated by NN-NEPL. There WCS assumes an important role
in creating new linkages between resource management on
the ground and policy-making in the capital, and introducing
international norms which seek to strengthen villagers’ rights.6. CONCLUSIONS: COMPENSATED EXCLUSIONS?
The insights derived from the three governance arrange-
ments indicate the analytical power of the updated property
rights framework although they are not generalizable in a sta-
tistical sense. The framework oﬀers a bottom-up perspective
on actual practices and relationships in natural resource gov-
ernance that is applicable to a wide range of natural resources
and geographical contexts. It considers a large diversity of
actors at local, national, and international levels and the
increasingly common provision of indirect beneﬁts. It is able
to capture the emergence of new types of rights, in particular
use rights arising from the provision of indirect beneﬁts and
authoritative rights deﬁning the scope of control rights. The
framework is suﬃciently simple to allow comparisons between
governance arrangements in diﬀerent sites, and identify simi-
larities and diﬀerences among them. It simultaneously oﬀersPlease cite this article in press as: Sikor, T. et al. Property Rights Re
World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.12a lens that is diﬀerentiated enough to open up black boxes
commonly encountered in research and policy, such as simplis-
tic categories of ownership, common property, and state.
Application of the updated property rights framework to
three governance interventions in East Asia suggests novel
transformations of natural resource governance. It is nothing
new to note that local people remain excluded from the exer-
cise of control and authoritative rights (e.g., Ribot et al.,
2006). Nor does it surprise that villagers’ rights to direct uses
are restricted to secondary beneﬁts (e.g., Edmunds &
Wollenberg, 2003). However, increasing reliance on the provi-
sion of indirect beneﬁts may be a novel transformation, partic-
ularly if local people’s access to these beneﬁts may over time
give rise to enduring indirect use rights. However, access to
indirect beneﬁts may or may not develop into use rights over
time, and these indirect use rights may be of variable strength
and enforceability since they remain amenable to revision by
policy-makers.
Our empirical insights from China and Laos suggest the
possibility of a wider trend of ‘‘compensated exclusions” in
natural resource governance. As villagers remain excluded
from the exercise of control and authoritative rights, they
may gain access to various indirect beneﬁts to complement
their limited rights to direct beneﬁts and, possibly, compensate
them for their exclusion from control and authoritative rights.
The provision of indirect beneﬁts and development of indirect
use rights may work to reinforce the exclusions if indirect ben-
eﬁts are seen as a form of compensation. Compensated exclu-
sions diﬀer from other trends observed in natural resource
governance, such as privatization (Mansﬁeld, 2008) and
‘‘green grabbing” (Fairhead, Leach, & Scoones, 2012;
Mahanty et al., 2012; Mahanty et al., 2013). Compensated
exclusions do not involve local people’s outright dispossession
from natural resources but exclude them from direct resource
beneﬁts and governance in other ways—yet simultaneously
seek to compensate their losses through the provision of indi-
rect beneﬁts.
Other novel transformations may originate from the chang-
ing inﬂuence of international actors and norms on natural
resource governance. Our empirical insights indicate the possi-
bility of two new pathways through which international actors
and norms aﬀect governance on the ground besides their direct
involvement in the exercise of control rights (e.g., by operating
protected areas together with state agencies). First, an increas-
ing set of international norms, including inter-state agree-
ments, voluntary standards and codes of good practice,
inﬂuence national governments’ exercise of authoritative
rights. The REDD+ agreements under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention
on Biological Diversity, the Forest Stewardship Council and
the guidelines issued by international conservation organiza-
tions are just a few examples. Common to all these agreements
and norms seems to be the attempt to inﬂuence the exercise of
authoritative rights over natural resources for example
through minimum environmental standards (Ribot et al.,
2010). The other new pathway consists of eﬀorts by interna-
tional organizations, including NGOs, consultancies and tra-
ders, to establish use rights to indirect beneﬁts. International
actors not only seek a share in indirect beneﬁts but also work
to get their shares institutionalized as indirect use rights in var-
ious forms, such as through institutional overheads in PES,
brokerage fees in voluntary carbon markets, and operational
costs in REDD+ actions (cf. Corbera & Brown, 2010).
These ﬁndings indicate the practical beneﬁts of applying the
updated property rights framework to analyzing PES and
REDD+. PES and REDD+ may provide unprecedented pay-gimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis Revisited,
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incentives for enticing their compliance with management
restrictions, or means to cover opportunity costs (Stern,
2007; Wunder, 2005). Yet, considering them as compensated
exclusions would highlight the importance of looking beyond
payments to consider villagers’ role in the exercise of control
and authoritative rights (Beymer-Farris & Bassett, 2012;
Leggett & Lovell, 2012). Attention to the involved exclusions
would suggest the need for eﬀorts to enable villagers’ partici-
pation in PES and REDD+ design and implementation
through collaborative forms of policy-making and participa-
tory resource governance on the ground. Or to put it more
crudely, making PES and REDD+ work depends not only
on getting the level of payment right and identifying the cor-
rect recipients but also on involving local resource managers
in design and implementation in a meaningful manner.Please cite this article in press as: Sikor, T. et al. Property Rights Re
World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.12Our ﬁnal point is about the eﬀects of compensated exclu-
sions on the sustainability of natural resource use. Under-
standing the eﬀects of governance on resource use was a key
concern in Schlager and Ostrom’s (1992) article. The article,
together with many local case studies preceding and following
it, establishes the hypothesis that the sustainable management
of common pool resources requires that local people possess
not only use rights but also control rights (Agrawal &
Ostrom, 2001: 492, 508, Chhatre & Agrawal, 2009). If correct,
the hypothesis does not bode well for the potential of compen-
sated exclusions. What incentive would local people have to
conserve natural resources except the expectation of future
compensation? What would happen once the payments pause
or stop? Natural resource governance may require local peo-
ple’s involvement in the exercise of control and authority in
order to facilitate sustainable natural resource use.NOTES1. Previous eﬀorts toward updating Schlager and Ostrom’s conceptual
schema include those of Mohammed and Inoue, 2014a, 2014b who
analyze decentralization in natural resource management by incorporating
directly Schlager and Ostrom’s (1992) diﬀerent types of property rights
into Agrawal and Ribot’s (1999) framework of Actor-Power-
Accountability.
2. The title of our paper mimics the title of Schlager and Ostrom’s article
to acknowledge the intellectual legacy.
3. We do not repeat the deﬁnitions of the ﬁve rights here for reasons of
space, and because we do not want to duplicate the discussion below.
Also, as noted by Schlager and Ostrom (1992), de facto property rights
originate not only from the state (de jure rights) but also from other kinds
of legal systems, such as various forms of customary rules.
4. Our argument on policy-based entitlements is diﬀerent from contem-
porary work on how carbon forestry and emissions trading may
commoditize carbon and thereby create ‘‘new forms of exchangeable
property” (Corbera & Brown, 2010: 1739; see also Mahanty et al., 2013).
5. We prefer the term ‘‘control” over Schlager and Ostrom’s (1992)
‘‘collective-choice rights” because control emphasizes the political
dimensions of these rights and resonates with the common distinction
between access to natural resources and control over access (Ribot &
Peluso, 2003).
6. For example, Agrawal and Ostrom acknowledge that ‘‘for commu-
nities to possess collective choice-making capabilities, some rules at a
constitutional level [. . .] must give them this authority” (2001: 489; see also
Ostrom, 1994). The neglect of third-order rights is a thread running
through Ostrom’s work. Social actors exerting more direct inﬂuence on
resource governance are considered to be ‘‘external authorities”, which
may threaten villagers’ autonomy to ‘‘determine access and harvesting
rules without external authorities countermanding them” (Ostrom, 1999:
4). It may be due to this blind spot that her empirical results on the
inﬂuence of autonomy on collective action have been inconclusive (Poteete
& Ostrom, 2004: 15–16).
7. We take this term from Jesse Ribot’s work on decentralization in
natural resources management (e.g., Ribot et al., 2010:4).
8. We acknowledge two challenges faced in the research. First, capturing
actual rights was diﬃcult for uses deemed illegal, in particular hunting in
NN-NEPL. In response, we supplement our data with preliminary insightsgained from interviews, food diaries and plot interviews by Neil Dawson
and Laura Rasmussen in 2014. Second, although we spoke to all kinds of
villagers (of diﬀerent wealth, status, ethnicity, gender, etc.) we realize that
a full understanding of diﬀerentiated rights would require further study.
Our results suggest that villagers generally held similar understandings of
the applicable property rights and possessed the same types of rights,
causing us to speak of ‘‘villagers” and ‘‘farmers” in the following
discussion. Yet, we are aware that in-depth research may reveal contes-
tations among villagers hidden from our view.
9. Two basic types of land use certiﬁcates are delivered to smallholder
farmers in China. Agricultural land use certiﬁcates entitle farmers with
rights for 30 years, while forestland use certiﬁcates grant rights for
70 years. The latter long-term contract is expected to encourage small-
holder investment in forestry (He, 2012). Whereas both certiﬁcates entitle
farmers to a range of property rights, including land transfer, inheritance
and mortgaging, they also establish that forestland cannot be used for
agricultural purposes (He, 2012). Within the SLCP framework, farmers’
agricultural land use certiﬁcates are changed to forestland use certiﬁcates
once aﬀorestation of the agricultural land is complete (He, 2014). Thus, it
becomes impossible for farmers to convert the land back to an agricultural
status.
10. The administrative village (e.g., Pingzhang) is the lowest level in
China’s administrative hierarchy, followed by the township, county,
prefecture, province and central level.
11. TNC/CI initially conceived of the pilot as a reforestation project
under the CDM but subsequently re-oriented it toward the voluntary
carbon market, for which they sought the CCBA rating.
12. For example, the country forest department and TNC/CI knew that
they had to select deforested land for reforestation that had been barren
for at least 20 years.
13. Note that the material beneﬁts are much lower in the pear plantations
established in the ﬁrst round of SLCP implementation in Pingzhang.
14. Does the amount of indirect beneﬁts suﬃce to compensate villagers
for losses incurred from the land use restrictions? Answering this question
goes beyond the scope of our research. The evidence available to us on
both the VCMP and NN-NEPL indicates that the value of indirect
beneﬁts does not compensate villagers fully. This would match observa-
tions made in other comparable interventions (To et al. 2012 on PES
Vietnam).gimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis Revisited,
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